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I Introduction 
Over the past two decades the governments of many developing countries 
have become increasingly involved in directly promoting industrialisation. The 
degree of government intervention has varied greatly, in terms of both the 
overall level of assistance to the industrial sector (ranging from licence-giving 
to widespread protection) and the nature of assistance given to the individual 
firm within the sector (automatic or discretionary, once-for-all or on-going, 
general or specific). The prevalence of such government intervention com-
bined with the failure of these and other policies to achieve the desired targets 
(higher growth rates, more equitable income distribution and in particular full 
employment) has generated a torrent of literature since the late 1960s under 
the general heading of Social Cost Benefz't Analysis. The objective of this 
literature has been to develop a practical technique whereby a government 
agency in a developing country can evaluate individual industrial projects 
(both private and public) in terms of their total effects on society, by taking 
into account the objectives of, and constraints on the economy. 
The purpose of this paper is to show the relevance of such methods of pro-
ject appraisal to the industrial development programme currently in operation 
in Ireland. In Section 2 of the paper, we outline the basic methodology of pro-
ject appraisal as evolved for less developed countries and consider in what 
respects this methodology would require modification for a semi-developed 
country such as Ireland. In Section 3 we examine the appropriateness of the 
methodology to the Irish context, and compare it with the methods used 
presently by the Industrial Development Authority (IDA) to evaluate projects . 
Finally, Section 4 reviews the value and limitations of using this methodology 
to evaluate industrial projects in Ireland. 
2 Project Appraisal: The Social Viewpoint 
2.1 Project Appraisal: Private and Social 
The concept of project appraisal, by which we mean calculating the costs 
and benefits of a project, is by no means a new one in economics. For example, 
*I am very grnteful to the Editorial Committee of the Quarterly Economic Commentary and Maurice FG. 
Scott for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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we are familiar with how the business man chooses between alternative projects 
on the basis of their discounted cash flows, that is, the stream of net income 
arising from each alternative. In general, the project which yields the highest 
private return over the investment period will be chosen, as long as its net pre-
sent value is greater than or equal to zero. Thus the assumption that business 
men, among whom we include portfolio investors, maximize discounted profits 
implies that in a market economy, there will be a strong tendency for the most 
privately profitable investments to be undertaken. 
The novel aspect in the recent literature on project appraisal, as found in 
the OECD (1968) manual by Little and Mirrlees1 or in the UNIDO (1972) 
manual, lies in the method suggested to measure the costs and benefits of 
industrial projects from a socz'al rather than a private point of view. While it is 
appropriate for the business man to use market prices to measure the costs and 
benefits of alternative investment strategies in terms of the flow of income they 
generate for him or the owners of the project, this measure will in general be 
inappropriate for estimating the costs and benefits of such a project to society. 
Both manuals argue that the appropriate measure for evaluating projects.from 
a social perspective is socz'al proft'tability, and provide feasible methods for 
measuring this concept. Social profitability is conceptually analogous to 
private profitability - it measures the flow of net socz'al benefits from a par-
ticular project. However, instead of using market prices to value the project's 
inputs and outputs, as appropriate for estimating private profits, shadow 
prices are used to value these same inputs and outputs, and in addition to take 
account of any indirect effects of the project, such as externalities, which do 
not enter the private profitability calculations, e.g., pollution, market 
development, etc. Both manuals concentrate on the problems of deriving and 
estimating shadow prices, which reflect the true social costs and benefits of 
particular factors and goods. 
The main emphasis in both manuals is placed on those divergences bet-
ween social and private profitability which are due firstly to distortions2 in 
factor and goods markets (arising from government policies, monopoly power, 
etc.) and secondly to income distribution effects. (While the business man is 
not concerned with the effects of different projects on income distribution per 
se, these effects can have a serious impact on welfare, especially in developing 
countries, where there may be few policy instruments available to government 
to manipulate the distribution of income. In extreme cases, project selection 
itself may be the only policy instrument for redistributing income. )8 Relatively 
1. This manual has been revised and extended in Little & Mirrlees (1974). We will refer to this later 
version as the LM manual. 
2. We follow the literature here in using 'distortions' to refer to any disturbances in goods or factor markets 
which result in prices not being Pareto optimal. The term distortion does not imply any value judgement. 
3. There are basically two reasons why project selection may be required to redistribute income in 
developing countries: firstly, neither taxation, nor redistribution at the level of the individual family unit 
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little attention is paid by either manual to what have traditionally been seen as 
the important social aspects of industrial projects in the development process, 
namely, externalities, linkages, etc. The authors of both manuals argue that 
the divergences between market and shadow prices created by such market 
distortions as tariffs, excise taxes, interest subsidies, and wage rigidities are 
quantitatively far more important than those created by externalities, 
linkages, etc. and hence, concentrate their energies on dealing with the former 
rather than the latter. 4 
The estimation of a complete set of shadow prices is seen as the key step in 
evaluating projects from a social perspective. These prices take account of both 
the resource and fiscal constraints on a country's achieving a higher level of 
welfare. The notion of prices which take account of resource constraints is very 
familiar in economics: such prices measure the opportunity costs of particular 
goods and factors. On the other hand the notion of prices which take account 
of fiscal constr!lints is quite novel and very important, as it means that the 
values in the government's social welfare function can be incorporated con-
sistently into the evaluation of each project. This point will become clear when 
we discuss the derivation and estimation of shadow prices in Section 2.2. 
However, before turning to discuss how such shadow prices might be 
calculated, it is important to recognise the difficulty of calculating the costs 
and benefits of a project, even at market prices. The main problem is the 
uncertainty about future prices: these must be estimated in order to calculate 
the stream of future costs and benefits. To do this it is inevitable that one has 
to make some heroic assumptions, but it may be some consolation to those at-
tempting a social evaluation, that many of these assumptions must also be 
made in calculating the private profitability of the project. 
2.2 Derivation and Estimation of Shadow Prices 
The methods for calculating shadow prices are complex, and it is impossi-
ble to set them out in any detail here. The interested reader is referred to the 
may be feasible because of large administrative costs, so that transferring income to poorer groups which are 
concentrated in the same area may be undertaken more efficiently through project selection. Secondly, even 
if there are no such administrative problems, the incentive effects of taxes and subsidies may make it more 
efficient to use project choice to redistribute income. Sen (1975), Little and Mirrlees (1974) and Little 
Scitovsky and Scott (1970) .argue that, in the absence of lump-sum taxation, job creation through project 
selection is one of the most effective methods of redistributing income. 
4. In so far as one is dealing with a marginal industrial project, this may indeed be true, and in such a 
case, ignoring externalities may be a practical shortcut. However, one would have to be wary of ignoring 
externalities in the case of a large project, such as the proposal to build a zinc-ore smelter in Ireland. Lal 
(1975) argues further that what are often considered to be important externalities are in fact misconceived 
externalities in the project appraisal context. In particular he cites Hirschman's backward and forward 
linkages, which he says are only relevant in project appraisal if they affect non-traded goods which have 
indivisibilities in production (when in fact the externality is due to the indivisibility, not the linkage) or if 
there is an unlimited supply of investment funds (which is most unlikely to be the case in either less-
developed or semi-developed economies). See Lal (1975), pp. 74-6. 
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LM and UNIDO manuals, to Squire and van der Tak (1975), 5 Little and Scott 
(1976), Scott, MacArthur and Newbery (1976), and Schwartz and Berney 
(1977). Both manuals see the problem of estimating shadow prices as one of 
finding the easiest method of adjusting market prices, so that they measure 
social costs and benefits correctly, and provide the basis for consistent social 
evaluation of marginal projects, i.e., they work from market prices, which are 
known, to shadow prices. Shadow prices are required for all goods (including 
services), both traded and non-traded, and for all factors (in practice this 
means labour, and finding the correct discount rate for investment projects); 
these prices are interdependent, as distortions in factor markets will 
affect prices in goods markets and vice versa. 6 We now consider each of these 
shadow prices and introduce a simple model to demonstrate how profits 
estimated using market prices provide little guidance to the relative social 
benefits of different projects. 
The assumption that, as far as most trade is concerned, developing coun-
tries can be treated as small open economies, is made in both manuc1:ls. This 
assumption implies that the particular economy in question has no influence 
on world prices - it can buy or sell as much as it wishes on world markets, 
without affecting prices. In other words the prices of all traded goods are 
parametrically given for this economy. 7 Thus while market prices for traded 
goods may be highly distorted (because of tariffs, quotas, export taxes, etc.) 
the shadow prices for traded goods are given by border prices, which measure 
the rate at which the country can trade its exports for imports, i.e., border 
prices represent the opportunity cost to the country or producing a particular 
good. The contrast between market and border prices is illustrated in Table 1 
which demonstrates the relationship between the output produced by, and the 
traded inputs used by, the marginal worker at market and shadow prices. 
Our example considers two projects, A and B, which produce traded 
goods using imported inputs, non-traded inputs and labour. All projects last 
for a single period only. The market prices of both inputs and outputs of each 
project are identical, and if we assume that other production costs (non-traded 
inputs and labour) are the same for both projects, then the private profits of 
both projects are identical. However, the output of Project B is protected by a 
higher tariff than that of Project A, such that the value of output of Project A 
is twice that of Project B at border prices, though identical at market prices. 
Thus while market prices indicate that the projects are equally profitable, Pro-
5. The book by Squire and van der Tak probably provides the best introduction to social cost benefit 
analysis. 
6. For a simple description of how precisely trade distortions can affect factor prices, see Findlay & Wellisz 
(1976). 
7. Except in the very short run where contracts are fixed, this assumption is valid for many developing 
countries, as it is for Ireland. 
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ject A, assuming that other production costs are identical, is far more socially 
profitable than Project B. 8 
Prices(£) 
Output Value 
Imported Inputs 
Profits (including other 
production costs) 
TABLE 1 
Project A 
Market Shadow 
200 100 
30 20 
170 80 
Project B 
Market Shadow 
200 50 
30 20 
170 30 
The estimation of shadow prices for non-traded goods is considerably 
more complex. The approach taken in the LM manual is to distinguish in the 
first instance be.tween whether or not the u,se or production of a marginal unit 
of a non-traded good leads to adjustments in the production of that good (in 
which case we look at its marginal social cost), in its consumption (in which 
case we must look at its marginal social benefit) or both (in which case the 
shadow price of the good is a combination of the values of marginal social cost 
and benefit). If output expands as the demand for a non-traded commodity 
expands, then the marginal social cost of increased production is estimated by 
valuing the inputs necessary to increase production at shadow prices. In this 
case, the non-traded good is decomposed into traded and non-traded com-
ponents, using input-output tables. As above, the traded components are 
valued at borcler prices, while the non-traded components are further decom-
posed into traded and non-traded sub-components, until eventually the good 
can be measured in terms of traded elements and primary factors only, and 
valued at their shadow prices. If consumption of the non-traded good 
elsewhere in the economy falls as the project generates additional demand, 
then the marginal social benefit of this reduced consumption is measured by 
'assessing the net social cost of the changes in producer and consumer surplus 
and related changes in expenditure patterns induced by the increase in price 
required to divert the non-traded input to the project'. (Squire and van der 
Tak (1975, p. 34). The LM manual provides a short-cut for this procedure: 9 
the shadow price for a range of non-traded goods is calculated and the ratio of 
these prices to market prices is used to estimate a standard conversion factor, 
i.e., if the market price of any given non-traded good is multiplied by this fac-
tor, an approximate estimate of its shadow price will be obtained. Obviously, 
8. This assumes that the recipients of the profits of private projects are identical in both cases. 
9. They argue that it will not be practical to attempt to estimate the shadow price for each and every non-
traded good in this rigorous manner although for any very important non-traded input used in production, 
it would be advisable to do so. 
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in principle, for each good there is a true conversion factor, and to the extent 
that the true conversion factor differs from the standard conversion factor, the 
estimate of social profitability which is produced will be incorrect. It is now 
time to introduce non-traded goods into our example. 
Prices(£) 
Output Value 
Imported Inputs 
Non-Traded 
Inputs 
Profits (including 
labour costs) 
TABLE 2 
Project A Project B 
Market Shadow Market Shadow 
200 100 200 50 
30 20 30 20 
30 20 30 20 
140 60 140 10 
Project C 
Market Shadow 
200 100 
30 20 
30 15 
140 65 
In Table 2 we see that the shadow prices of both traded and non-traded 
inputs used in Projects A and B are identical, while the shadow prices of the 
non-traded inputs used in Project C are lower. Thus, if we assume identical 
private and social labour costs for each project, we find that the private profits 
of Projects A, B and C are identical, while the social profitability of C is 
highest and that of B lowest. We now turn to consider what is probably the 
most important element in estimating social profitability in developing coun-
tries, namely, the social cost of labour. 
The two crucial elements in the calculation of the social cost of labour for 
a project, namely the shadow wage, are the output foregone in the rest of the 
economy through employing an additional man10 on that project and the social 
value of the resulting additional consumption which depends crucially on the 
income levels of those benefiting from the project and the values implicit in 
the government's social welfare function. If the income distribution effects of 
the project are ignored, the shadow wage is simply identified as the value 
marginal product of labour employed in the best alternative to the project in 
question, i.e., employment on the project should expand, until the value 
marginal product of labour equals that of the best alternative. In most 
developing countries, however, the wage paid to labour employed on industrial 
projects greatly exceeds its alternatz've value marginal product, 11 and it is 
important to consider the income distribution effects of the marginal 
10. While it is customary in most of the theoretical literature on project appraisal to refer to the shadow 
wage, implying that labour is homogenous, this assumption can be relaxed very easily. In practice, a single 
shadow wage is probably not inappropriate to most industrial projects in many developing countries. 
11. LM consider the case where the wage in the industrial sector is set institutionally above the prevailing 
wages in other sectors of the economy. 
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individual's being paid this higher wage. The income distribution effects 
depend on (a) the individual's (and his family's) income under both alternative 
types of employment; (b) how the additional income (consumption) of this 
individual is funded; and ( c) the relative weights of the different objectives 
(e.g. increase efficiency, greater equality in the distribution of income, etc.) in 
the government's social welfare function; As long as the opportunity cost, in 
terms of government revenue, of funding this additional consumption is 
positive, but less than infinite, the shadow wage will be greater than the output 
foregone elsewhere in the economy as a result of employing an additional man 
on the project, but will be less than the market wage he is paid. Table 3 
illustrates how the labour costs affect private and social profits, and 
demonstrates clearly the extent to which private profitability can be a poor 
indicator of the relative social profitability of different projects. The market 
wages facing all projects are identical and greater than the shadow wages, 
which are identical for Projects A, B and C and lower for Project D. 12 In 
private profit terms all four projects perform identically, while the social 
profits which arise from employing the marginal worker range from -£40, to 
£30. 
TABLE 3 
Prices Project A Project B Project C Project D 
(£) Market Shadow Market Shadow Market Shadow Market Shadow 
Output Value 200 100 200 50 200 100 200 100 
Imported Inputs 30 20 30 20 30 20 30 20 
Non-Traded Inputs 30 20 30 20 30 15 30 20 
Labour 120 50 120 50 120 50 120 30 
Profits 20 10 20 -40 20 15 20 30 
Finally, we consider briefly the appropriate rate of interest at which the 
returns from projects in an intertemporal model should be discounted. Both 
manuals claim that savings in developing economies are sub-optimal because 
of externalities and/ or monopolistic and fiscal distortions. 13 They argue 
strongly that the rate of interest used to discount investment projects ( the 
accounting rate of interest) must reflect the weights attached to present and 
12. The shadow wage for Project D might be lower because the labour it employs has a lower opportunity 
cost than that labour employed on Projects A, B or C, or because the income distribution effects arising 
from employment on Project D are more favourable than those associated with the other projects. 
13. The externalities tend to arise from the interdependency of actions: for example, while a person may 
be willing to save in order that future generations may be better off, he will not undertake additional saving 
if he thinks that this will lead others of his generation to reduce their savings. Furthermore, as the consumer 
is mortal his attitude to saving could be expected to differ from that of the collective society. Monopolistic 
and fiscal distortions tend to discourage savings by individuals on low incomes. See Little, Scitovsky and 
Scott (1970). 
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future consumption in the government's social welfare function. Estimation of 
the accounting rate of interest is, they admit, the most difficult component of 
project evaluation. For a further discussion see LM, chapter 14. 
2.3 Project Evaluatz"on with Shadow Prices 
We now turn to consider how the shadow prices discussed in the last 
section can be used in the evaluation of industrial projects. In fact the LM 
manual develops its methodology primarily for government-owned projects; 
this means that all of the 'private' profits generated by a project go directly 
into the hands of the government, which will distribute them in such a way as 
to maximize welfare. When the project is privately-owned, part of the profits 
go to the government in the form of taxes (in which case that portion is iden-
tical to a government-owned project, for the government is a part-owner in 
every project up to the amount of the tax rate); 14 the remaining profits go to 
the capitalists and must be valued in like manner to the increase in wage 
income: as capitalists are assumed to be wealthy, the component of their pro-
fits consumed will receive a low weight relative to that of low-wage workers, 
whereas the component saved will receive a larger weight if savings are sub-
optimal.15 
Despite the fact that the LM manual concentrates on publicly-owned 
industrial projects, it does not assume that the body responsible for socially 
evaluating these projects has any widespread control over fiscal instruments. In 
particular, the manual is concerned with the case where the project-evaluation 
agency, referred to as the COPE (the Central Office of Project Evaluation), 
must appraise projects in whose output and/ or input markets, there are 
government-created distortions. Thus the method of project appraisal 
described does not presume the use of first best policies by the government, 
and although a particular COPE may have some influence on the introduction 
or reform of certain fiscal policies (tariffs, factor subsidies, etc.), such 
influence is not assumed. 16 
Using the set of shadow prices estimated for an economy, the project 
evaluation agency calculates the social profit of alternative projects. If a pro-
ject is socially unprofitable then it should be rejected, no matter how privately 
profitable it is, as undertaking this project would be welfare reducing. In prac-
tice it may not be possible for the project evaluators to stop such a project 
14. For example, if there is a profits tax of 50%, then effectively the government has a half share in the 
firm. · 
15. If the capitalists are foreigners, then their consumption would receive a zero weighting; in this way the 
LM manual deals with foreign investment as a very special case of private investment. For a fuller treatment 
of the problems involved in appraising foreign projects, see Lal (1975) and Newbery in Little and Scott 
(1976). . 
16. See Dasgupta (1972) for a discussion of the effects of having a more or less powerful COPE. 
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being undertaken ( especially if the private profits generated are large), but the 
agency can make certain that it receives no government aid. 
The main task for the project evaluation agency occurs when after the 
initial evaluation it emerges that the project is socially profitable but not 
privately profitable. The agency then has to calculate whether, if given suffi-
cient government assistance to ensure private profitability, the project would 
still be socially profitable.17 If it would still be socially profitable, then such 
assistance should be given. While this rule for when to accept or reject a pro-
ject, and how much assistance to give it is very straightforward, it is not made 
clear how the assistance should be given. Assuming that it is not possible to 
eliminate the distortions or overcome the fiscal constraints which cause private 
and social profits to deviate, the project evaluation agency can ensure private 
profitability by giving either an output or factor subsidy to the firm. The 
preferred method of assistance will be that which brings shadow and market 
prices for the firm closest together, thereby minimizing by-product distortions. 
For example, if the only distortion in the economy occurs in the labour market, 
where market wages exceed shadow wages, and lump-sum taxation is possible, 
then the first best policy will be to subsidize the wage faced by the firm, to 
eliminate the difference between shadow and market wages. 18 However, the 
agency may not find it possible to follow first best policies, because of adminis-
trative and political pressures, pressures from existing firms arguing that they 
cannot compete with subsidized firms, 19 or pressure from trade unions in the 
assisted firms. 20 Such pressures have undoubtedly led many countries to assist 
firms individually, on a once-for-all basis, by giving concessions such as capital 
grants, rather than on-going wage or value-added subsidies. 
Finally, we consider the case of projects which are both privately and 
socially profitable. Such projects are those which would be undertaken without 
government assistance, but in the presence of schemes to assist industrial 
investment, they are likely to seek financial assistance. As long as the project 
will definitely go ahead without assistance, the agency should try to withstand 
any pressure to give assistance, as each£ paid out reduces social profitability. 
If the project may not be undertaken without assistance, despite its private 
17. Clearly the assistance given by the government is an additional cost, which must be subtracted from 
the initially calculated social profits. 
18. If it is not possible to intervene at the source of the distortion, then additional resource costs are 
incurred; this point has been widely discussed in the trade and welfare literature (see Bhagwati (1971), 
Corden (1974) and Neary (1978) for a discussion of the problems of using second best policies to eliminate 
the effects of immovable distortions), but has been ignored in the literature on project appraisal. Findlay & 
Wellisz (1976) draw attention to this omission, and illustrate its importance. 
19. This argument will generally be weaker for exporting or new import substituting projects, which are 
those aided under the IDA programme in Ireland. 
20. If trade unions, in the light of the wage subsidy, put upward pressure on wages in that firm, then the 
effects of the subsidy will be negated, and the project may fail. 
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profitability, which is often the case for foreign-owned projects which are 
mobile between countries in response to differential assistance, then the agency 
should consider giving such a firm assistance. However, as in the case of 
privately unprofitable projects, it should pay the minimum amount necessary 
to guarantee the project's being undertaken. 
2.4 Project Appraisal z'n Semz'-Developed Economies 
The literature on project appraisal which we have been discussing has 
been developed primarily for developing countries. Before turning to compare 
these methods with the approach taken by the IDA to project appraisal, we 
consider briefly in what respects the methods would have to be refined to take 
account of the different characteristics of semi-developed economies. There 
would seem to be a number of obvious but not very substantive differences: 
1) The simplifying assumptions made already about the labour market in 
developing countries, even allowing for the extensions referred to above, 
would be seriously inadequate for analysing the more complex economic 
structures of semi-developed economies. In such economies it is essential to 
disaggregate labour by different skill categories, to allow for different 
types of labour market distortions, to distinguish a number of sectors in the 
economy from which the labour for the marginal project might be drawn 
and to specify the equilibrating mechanisms in different labour markets. 
The source of labour is a vital component of the shadow wage; if the labour 
comes from the unemployment pool, then its opportunity cost may be 
zero, 21 whereas if it comes from some other sector, its opportunity cost will 
be measured by its marginal product in that sector. 
2) There are likely to be more instruments available for income redistribution 
in semi-developed compared with less-developed countries. 22 This means 
that the relative importance of using project appraisal as a method of 
redistributing income either inter- or intra-generationally may be reduced. 
However, it cannot be ignored entirely, and is likely to be important for 
regional redistribution in particular. 
21. The opportunity cost will not necessarily be zero; whether it is or not depends on how the labour 
market operates. In Harris-Todaro (1970) type models, where labour is assumed to migrate to urban areas 
in response to the probability of attaining employment (which is assumed to depend directly on the 
unemployment rate in the urban sector), the effect of drawing a worker from the unemployment pool is to 
induce further migration, from rural into urban areas. Since labour employed in agriculture has a positive 
marginal product, the opportunity cost is positive. 
22. It should be noted, however, that while there may be a variety of instruments for redistribution in a 
particular semi-developed economy, redistribution may be seriously constrained in practice by strong 
sectional interests. Marglin ( 1976) chapter 2, provides a general discussion of the impact of such constraints 
on employment creation. In Ireland the strength of such sectional interests has become increasingly 
apparent in recent years. 
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3) Institutional factors are likely to play a more important role in more 
developed economies. For example the existence of unemployment 
benefits, organised labour and management, etc., will affect the calcula-
tion of shadow prices, and add to the complexity of the costs and benefits 
to be counted. 
Despite these differences the methodology is at least in principle equally 
valid for semi-industrialised countries, as much as for less-developed 
economies. If there is a divergence between social and private profitability 
then, no matter what the category of country, there is an argument for govern-
ment intervention. The greater complexity in the structure of more-developed 
economies is likely to add to the complications of measuring social profit-
ability; these complications should not be insurmountable, and semi-
developed economies should make the necessary resources available to ensure 
that the government intervention is justified, and if justified, efficiently under-
taken. 23 
2. 5 Socz"al Profitabilz'ty and Proximate Economic Targets 
Finally, before turning to examine the potential for, and problems arising 
in, using project appraisal in Ireland we wish to consider why social profit-
ability, rather than growth potential, employment or desirable income 
redistribution effects, is the sole valid criterion for ranking projects. Social 
profitability incorporates both the production constraints on the economy, and 
the economy's objectives, weighted in accordance with the country's social 
welfare function. 24 Defining targets in such terms as higher growth rate or 
more equitable income distribution is misleading: no country wants maximum 
growth, as this would be at the expense of present consumption, and it may not 
want a completely egalitarian income distribution, because of the incentive 
effects of such a policy. In some sense there will always be some optimal level of 
growth and income redistribution consistent with the government's priorities, 
given the constraints it faces; if there must be a trade-off between these two 
23. The question of when government intervention is justified is a difficult one; there is a danger in 
assuming that, for example, unemployment always justifies the payment of wage subsidies, because it signals 
some distortion in the labour market, which forces the real wage to exceed the market-clearing wage. This 
unemployment may not be due to any distortion, but may be the result of cyclical or seasonal factors, or may 
be search unemployment which is necessary to produce the correct allocation of labour. To justify 
intervention, it is necessary to ascertain that there is a distortion in the first place, and then to measure the 
extent of the distortion to determine how much intervention is required. It is possible that what appears at 
first sight to be a distortion may indeed be optimal. For a further discussion of this question, see Stiglitz 
(1976). 
24. We assume that the social welfare values implied are those of the elected government, which is 
assumed to be behaving in a benevolent manner. Although most countries do not have explicit welfare 
functions, for political reasons, project evaluators should attempt to approximate it from government 
statements, tax and benefit schedules, etc. This task may prove to be one of the greatest facing the project 
evaluation agency. 
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targets (e.g., to obtain more growth, there must be more savings, and in order 
to generate these savings a less equal distribution of income is required as the 
marginal propensity to save of the higher income groups is larger25) then this 
trade-off is determined by the relative importance of these two targets in the 
government's social welfare function. 
The target most frequently discussed with relevance to developing coun-
tries in recent years is employment. Economists differ on the question of 
whether employment per se is a valid economic target: LM (1974) argue that it 
is not a valid target, as employment is not desirable in itself, 26 while Sen (1975) 
argues that although it may not be a valid economic target, it is a social target, 
because of its recognition aspects. 27 However, both agree that it is a very effec-
tive method of redistributing income, and warn against the widespread 
misapprehension in the development literature that in some sense the LDC 
faces a choice between increasing output and increasing employment. 28 What 
is the relationship between social profitability and employment? Employment 
as a target is in fact a component of social profitability: if employment is 
important, then the shadow wage will be low and social profitability will be 
high. Thus a project which is desirable when measured in terms of the employ-
ment target, will by definition be desirable in terms of the social profitability 
measure. Social profitability is a superior target as it allows a project to be 
evaluated simultaneously in terms of targets other than employment, such as 
growth potential. For a further discussion of the relationship between 
economic targets, see Ruane (1976), Section 2.1. 
3 Project Appraisal in Ireland 
In this section we consider two questions: firstly, is it feasible to calculate a 
set of shadow prices for Ireland? And secondly, in what way does the project 
appraisal discussed in the previous section differ from the approach taken by 
the IDA? 
3.1 Shadow Pri'ces for Ireland: Is Estimation Feasible.~ 
The calculation of shadow prices for Ireland is a perfectly feasible, if a 
25. Little, Scitovsky and Scott (1970) point out that the larger marginal propensity to save of some of the 
higher income groups does not necessarily justify the low level of income redistribution in LDCs on the 
grounds of the growth target as there is no guarantee that ·such savings will be invested in the LDC in 
question; they favour the use of government policies to increase household savings, which they regard as sub-
optimal, because of capital market inadequacies. (See chapter 2). Furthermore, if there is any Keynesian-
type excess capacity in the economy, the smaller marginal propensity to import out of lower incomes may 
result in increased growth being positively associated with a more equitable distribution of income. 
26. See Little and Mirrlees (1974), Section 4.31. 
27. See Sen (1975), chapters 1 and 8. 
28. The argument here is the simple one that, at any instant in time, as long as the value marginal product 
of labour on a particular project is non-negative, an increase in employment cannot reduce output. 
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rather long and tedious task. 29 However, as long as economic policies and social 
values remain broadly similar, the task should be a once-for-all one, with only 
relatively minor changes required from year to year. 30 As far as the prices of 
traded goods are concerned, Ireland can readily be assumed to be a small 
country, which means that border prices are accurate and simple measures of 
shadow prices. Furthermore as Ireland has a very open economy, the method 
outlined in the LM manual would be most appropriate as it is designed for 
such an economy.31 Irish membership of the EEC complicates the calculation 
of shadow prices in two respects. Firstly, Irish tariffs are in the process of being 
aligned with EEC levels: the shadow prices would have to take account of these 
adjustments and of the fact that, while trade with the EEC will eventually 
involve no tariff distortion, tariffs will remain with the non-EEC members, 
albeit at a lower level. Secondly, at present Irish agricultural goods are traded 
at a different exchange rate to all other tradeables; as long as the Green£ con-
tinues to differ in value from the Irish £, this will affect the relative value of 
agricultural to non-agricultural goods. Both of these complications again 
favour the use of the LM approach. 
The main complication arises in the labour market, because Irish labour 
has the opportunity of migrating to the UK in response to differential wage 
and employment prospects. The project appraisal manuals allow for migration 
of labour between sectors, but not between countries. However it may be the 
case that the existence of the UK labour market actually simplifies the calcula -
tions, as it represents a given price for labour from outside the economy, and 
hence the cost to certain individuals of remaining in Ireland. 32 Likewise the 
existence of an elaborate social security system provides a method of measuring 
the opportunity cost of taking up any kind of employment. It is vital that ac-
count be taken of the complexity of the system (in terms of the criteria for en-
titlement, the transferability of such provisions between different areas, and 
29. Shadow prices have already been estimated for several developing countries using the UNIDO and LM 
methodologies. For discussions of the problems involved in applying these methods, see Gutowski and 
Hammel (1972), Little and Scott (1976), Scott, MacArthur and Newbery (1976), and papers by Bacha and 
Fereidoun ira Schwartz and Berney (1977). 
30. More serious changes might be required in the event of increased competition between countries for 
foreign investment projects, which would affect the supply of such projects to the Irish economy. 
31. This is because the LM method uses prices of goods in terms of foreign currency as numeraire, while 
the UNIDO method uses the prices in terms of domestic currency, multiplied by the estimated shadow 
exchange rate. The more open the economy, the greater the advantages, in terms of accuracy and simplicity 
of the LM method compared with the UNIDO method, and vice-versa. See Dasgupta (1972). 
32. It is very important to model the migration process correctly: it may be the case that a Harris-Todaro 
(1970) type model would capture this aspect of the labour market adequately. For a discussion, see Walsh 
(1974). Furthermore the importance attached by the Irish government to the right of each individual to a 
job in Ireland should be taken account of in this calculation. 
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the availability of social security to the Irish worker who migrates to the UK) in 
using these data to capture the opportunity cost of remaining unemployed. 33 
On the benefit side we face the problem of deducing the government's 
social welfare function. The Irish government has not been particularly 
explicit in setting out its economic objectives; in different national plans it has 
outlined its objectives in terms of growth, income redistribution (particularly 
in the regional dimension) and employment, in qualitative rather than 
quantitative terms, and it has not specified the weights of, and hence the 
trade-off between these objectives.34 However, from the publicly stated objec-
tives and the value judgements inherent in the existing fiscal schemes, it may 
be possible for the project evaluation agency to derive an approximate social 
welfare function, which would be an acceptable measure of the government's 
values. 35 
3.2 Project Appraisal and the IDA 
In order to compare the IDA programme with the methods described 
above, we give a brief outline of how this programme operates. Business-men, 
both Irish and non-Irish, are encouraged to establish manufacturing plants in 
Ireland by means of a set of financial incentives (e.g. grants) and fiscal aids 
(e.g. tax reliefs). 36 The financial incentives, which are controlled by the IDA, 
are available on a discretionary basis - no element of the financial scheme is 
automatic. To determine whether, and to what extent a firm should receive 
financial aid, the IDA evaluates each project using a modified form of dis-
counted cash flow analysis. The method is modified in the sense that a 
qualitative allowance is made for certain non-private aspects37 of the project 
such as its high employment content (taking into account implicitly the low 
opportunity cost of labour), its location (which affects the regional dimension 
of income distribution), its externalities ('the full impact of the project on the 
33. Ruane (1979) uses these data to derive estimates of optimal labour subsidies for unskilled labour from 
the unemployment pool being employed on marginal industrial projects. This paper provides implicitly the 
only estimates of shadow wages available .for any type of industrial labour in Ireland. 
34. For a discussion of the validity of and trade-offs between Irish economic targets, see Ruane (1976), 
Section 2 .1. 
35. Indeed as the terms of reference given to the IDA are very general, it has been necessary for it to 
impute values to the government; the advantage of an explicit welfare function is that it makes targets 
explicit and it makes clear the necessary trade-offs which the project evaluator faces on behalf of the 
country. 
36. We will not discuss the fiscal aids here; they are given on an automatic basis to all firms which meet 
certain general conditions. 
37. These aspects are in the spirit of the additional costs and benefits referred to in Sections 2 .1 and 2. 2. 
As noted in those sections, the manuals, and the LM manual in particular, pay little attention to these 
adjustments, considering some, such as transfer payments, to be obvious, and others, such as externalities, 
to be relatively unimportant. 
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national income'), etc. 38 The IDA seems to attach particular importance to the 
firm's being privately profitable, independently of the financial aid it receives; 
the assistance given depends on the social aspects of the project, and is 
intended as an inducement to such profitable projects to locate in Ireland. In 
other words, the only projects which are considered are those which are 
privately profitable and the real question faced by the IDA is whether such 
projects are socially profitable, and how profitable they are. 
The main differences between the approach taken by the IDA and that in 
the LM and UNIDO manuals are the following: 
1) To rank projects, the IDA uses private profitability, with a qualitative 
allowance for the social (non-private) aspects of the projects, as a criterion, 
while the manuals use social profitability. To the extent that the IDA's 
quantitative allowances are rigorously and identically applied in the case of 
each project, and take into account the government's social values, then 
the two rankings will be close, but the IDA approach will always be 
inferior. 
2) If the project is privately profitable, then the IDA will pay a grant (the size 
of which is determined by reference to the project's desirable social 
attributes), in order to persuade the business man to undertake the project 
in Ireland. 39 There are upper limits set on the value of the grant which may 
be given; if this constraint binds, then the level of grant may not be suffi-
cient to win the project. According to the manuals, if on the first count, 
the project is socially profitable, but not sufficiently privately profitable to 
be undertaken by the private sector, then the evaluation agency may 
intervene to try to make it privately profitable. If the amount of subsidy 
required to make the project privately profitable does not reduce the level 
of social profitability below the required level (i.e., that it be socially 
profitable after receiving the subsidy), then the subsidy should be paid. If 
the level of subsidy required to make the project privately profitable makes 
it socially unprofitable, then the agency should reject the project. 
What are the advantages and disadvantages of the two approaches? The 
approach in the manuals requires the calculation of a complete set of shadow 
prices, which as we pointed out above, is a feasible but time-consuming task. 
Once these calculations had been made, however, the evaluation of individual 
projects would be relatively easy ( not much more difficult than discounted cash 
flow analysis), and one could be confident that, at the margin, all projects 
would be treated identically. The IDA approach avoids the explicit calculation 
of shadow prices, but it requires examination of the social aspects of each 
38. For details, see Industrial Development Authority (1976) and Ruane (1976), Section 2.2. 
39. This approach is more appropriate for foreign - rather than domestically - owned projects, as the 
former are in general more internationally mobile. 
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project individually; this approach makes it very difficult to ensure identical 
treatment for each project. 
The great advantage of social profitability as a criterion is that it allows 
one to determine whether or not the welfare of the country is being raised by 
having a particular project, and how much the country can afford to pay in the 
form of subsidies to win the project. 40 In the case of the IDA approach, there is 
a certain arbitrariness about the limit to the amount of aid which can be given, 
and there is no way of being certain that each particular project bargained for 
is desirable in itself. The danger in the IDA approach would seem to be that a 
project could receive aid when it was socially undesirable, or could be lost to 
another country because of the limits to assistance which are established in very 
general terms, despite being socially profitable. Furthermore, at a time when 
countries and regions in all areas of the globe are bargaining for international 
projects, it is important not to be misled by their activities, into paying too 
much for a project. The fact that other countries are willing to pay a lot for 
such projects should not necessarily lead Ireland to follow suit: these projects 
may have higher social profits in such countries (because of comparative ad-
vantage, say) or those countries may be mistaken in encouraging projects 
which actually reduce welfare. (See Levy and Sarnat (1975)). The IDA pro-
gramme is better than many in that it attempts to evaluate each project 
individually, rather than giving some global concession (as is done in many 
developing countries and in the UK development areas), but without the use of 
social profitability as a criterion, one cannot guarantee that this programme 
approves and aids socially desirable projects only. 
4 Project Appraisal - its Usefulness and Limitations 
The general argument in this paper is that the LM method of calculating 
shadow prices, as an ingredient in measuring social profitability of industrial 
projects, could be used very effectively in Ireland. The LM approach is in fact 
a refinement of what the IDA programme already does - this refinement 
would allow explicit account to be taken of the economic constraints and 
objectives in Ireland in a systematic way, which would ensure that only projects 
which are welfare-raising are grant-aided, whether they are or are not 
privately profitable. 
Project appraisal. does not of course guarantee industrial development in 
any sense. The IDA argues that its main problem lies not in choosing between 
projects but rather in finding appropriate projects from which to choose. 
While this may well be the case, it is not true to say that a bad (i.e., socially 
unprofitable) project is better than no project, as one might be led to believe. 
This brings us to an important practical question, namely, if a formal method 
40, For a comparison of the actual subsidies paid per job created on new projects with the subsidies based 
on shadow wage estimates (what Ireland can afford to pay), see Ruane (1979). 
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of project appraisal is to be introduced in Ireland, who should undertake it, 
i.e., who should be Ireland's COPE? In particular, should it be the IDA, the 
Department of Economic Planning and Development or a new body created 
specifically to establish the objectives for, formulate and review, industrial 
policy? Given that the IDA's primary role is to search out and market Ireland 
to potential investors, it might be more satisfactory if an alternative body 
would appraise the projects from a social perspective. Clearly there would be a 
close interaction between such a body and the IDA - in particular, IDA 
personnel would take account of the social criteria used by the project 
appraisal agency in its search activities. The existence of an independent 
agency might also provide a basis of establishing social profitability criteria 
inter-sectorally, and not merely within the industrial sector. In any event, 
given the importance attached to industrial development in Ireland, which is 
not unfortunately represented in a comprehensive industrial policy, we feel 
that it would be worthwhile to find the necessary additional resources to 
calculate shadow prices, in order to ensure that all projects which receive 
government assistance raise economic welfare. 
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